The Power of Disruptors: The Implications of Wagner’s Mutiny

In the head-spinning span of less than 24 hours, an armed rebellion was launched in Russia when an army of Wagner mercenaries captured the city of Rostov, began a “justice” march to overthrow opponents in Moscow, were declared traitors engaged in “mutiny” by Putin, stepped down and turned back, hours later pardoned by Putin, and their leader offered safe passage into Belarus. On June 26 Yevgeny Prigozhin issued a statement once again mocking Moscow, saying he had “delivered a master class in what should have happened on February 24, 2022.” Hours later, Putin addressed the Russian nation, reiterating his amnesty to Wagner soldiers, but promising to hold those behind the mutiny responsible.

Trouble for Putin averted? Far from it. Here is our analysis.


Known as “Putin’s Butcher,” Yevgeny Prigozhin, founder of Wagner Group, led a brief, failed coup on Moscow’s military leadership.


One lesson of life and war is disruption. No war is over until it’s over. Overconfidence tends toward disaster. There is always the possibility of disruptors and game changers.

A second lesson is that given enough time, bad actors tend to turn on each other. Think French and Russian Revolutions. The men who built the guillotines and established the firing squads ultimately used them on each other.

This week, disruption came to Vladimir Putin in the form of his protege, Yevgeny Prigozhin.

Prigozhin is Frankenstein’s monster turning on his creator. He is known to much of the world as “Putin’s Butcher.” From hotdog seller in St. Petersburg to one of the most feared, brutalitarian warlords in the world, Prigozhin has curated a mercenary army called the Wagner Group which was conceived and funded with Putin’s blessing as a private army of mercenaries. Under the command of Prigozhin, Wagner has been a useful tool for Putin in Syria, the Central African Republic, Sudan, and most recently, Ukraine.

Putin responded to the “armed mutiny.”

Wagner does Putin’s extra dirty, dirty work. Charges against Wagner for war crimes have been easily dismissed by Moscow because Wagner is not the official Russian army. Until Ukraine, Prigozhin and his mercenary army had a reputation for getting the job done. But Ukraine has been messy. Not at all what Putin had promised.

For some months now, Prigozhin has been fighting two wars. The first against the army and citizens of Ukraine. The second against the Russian military establishment who he believes has been using his troops as cannon fodder in a meat grinder of death. He is angry at the Russian military leadership and has been letting the world know. This week he accused Russian generals of firing missiles on his own men. That appears to be the straw that broke the camel’s back for Prigozhin. As America was bedding down on the evening of June 24, Prigozhin went rogue, captured the Russian border town of Rostov-on-Don and began a “justice march” to Moscow.

Members of the Wagner Group are met with enthusiasm by crowds in the Russian gateway city of Rostov during their brief insurrection.

There are no good guys in this story, just a lot of really bad guys revealing the fractures and fissures within the Russian war machine. At the outset of any evaluation on the stunning events of this week, it is important to acknowledge just how much information is unclear or unknown. We have Putin’s angry statement of opposition to Prigozhin. We have reports and images from the ground of the troop movement. We have footage of Wagner troops being warmly welcomed by citizens of Rostov. We have multiple postings from Prigozhin, before, during, and after the taking of Rostov and the march toward Moscow. We also have statements issued from Belarus indicating that a settlement had been brokered, that the conflict was over, participants pardoned, and Prigozhin welcomed to Belarus. We have Moscow’s official statement of intention to integrate Wagner troops in Ukraine into the Russian military.

Prigozhin Still A Player

It is clear that Prigozhin played his cards. A lot of them. But despite the end of the “justice march,” neither Prigozhin nor Putin have yet to fold. There may be much more in the future of Prigozhin who has amassed vast amounts of wealth, can operate outside of Russia, and continues to wield influence with Russian soldiers in Ukraine.

Prigozhin has curated an image of himself as a Russian’s Russian, the defender of the Russian soldier, a man of the military and the people. His voice has sway. The reputation of his mercenary army made him a folk hero with some.

In his July 25 broadcast, Putin once again accused the Jewish President of Ukraine of being a Nazi, and implicated America for the internal meltdown of the Russian military: "The enemies of Russia wanted, the Nazis in Kyiv and their Western sponsors and various assorted traitors, wanted bloodshed. They wanted Russian soldiers to kill each other. They wanted peaceful civilians and military personnel to die so that in the end Russia is defeated, our society is fractured and choked on the blood of internal strife," Putin said.  

This extraordinary move by Prigozhin does not mean that there will be a major shift in Russian strategy. It is altogether possible that there will be no changes in the immediate future. But the world is a bit different for Russian commanders on the ground. They have watched as Wagner was repeatedly pushed into a meat grinder until Prigozhin finally said enough, we will not do this any more. These commanders may be looking at the absence of Wagner as a doom vacuum for themselves. They are undoubtably asking themselves: If the Russian MOD can’t funnel Wagner into the meat grinder, who will they funnel next? My troops? It is not surprising that there have been reports of smaller Russian units capitulating and defecting.

The speed and bizarre nature of the events have caused some to wonder if all of this was part of an elaborate scheme cooked up by Putin to restructure his military leadership. But watch Putin’s declaration of war against Prigozhin issued hours after Rostov was taken by Wagner. He looks shaken. Angry. Authentic. It seems a far fetch to suggest this was some grand scheme launched by the Kremlin. Assuming the legitimacy of the failed coup, here are four take-aways:

The Foolishness of Overconfidence

From February 24, 2022, the invasion and assault on Ukraine has been an exercise in Putin’s overconfidence. Overconfidence of a speedy victory. Overconfidence that they would win the propaganda war both inside and external to Russia. Overconfidence in their misguided assessment of Ukraine’s resolve and capabilities to repel Russian invaders. Overconfidence that Putin’s veiled threats of nuclear retaliation against the West would sufficiently intimidate America and NATO. Overconfidence in their ability to use terror and the targeting of civilians to break the morale of the people of Ukraine. Now on display to the world is Putin’s overconfidence in his military henchmen. They are not under his control, as he once presumed.

Reputation Damage to Putin and the Russian Military

This week the world watched Putin’s overconfidence in his ability to control and lead his own military machine. The coup may have halted, but the blow to Putin’s reputation is significant. It is difficult to see meaningful positives from this event for Putin. The mutiny may have ended in less than 24 hours, but confidence has not been restored. The loss of Wagner as the point of the spear in offensive operations is likely a concern for Russian military commanders and morale.

But it is not only Putin whose reputation is damaged. Over the last sixteen months, we have seen Russia humiliated on the battlefield and the end of the reputation of the Russian military for dominance and invincibility. The world now knows that given the right circumstances, some are willing to challenge Putin. Even to humiliate him. Prigozhin’s short-lived mechanized confrontation of Moscow is another deep blow. It is a reminder that a Russian military which can not timely win in the field, and now does not control its own hired guns and commanders, is a weak military, rife with incompetence. It is the end of Russian invincibility.

Putin Loses a Valuable Asset

For years Wagner has given Putin a band of militarized assassins willing to do his bidding while deflecting criticism for their atrocities away from himself because Wagner is a unit technically outside the Russian military. At least for the moment, Wagner is no longer an operation unit available to Putin. Putin is now attempting to integrate a large number of Wagner mercenaries into the Russian Army, but it is not clear how that fills the gap for what they were accomplishing as an organized unit operating in Ukraine.

Wagner’s involvement in Russia’s invasion began as an augmentation to Russian armed forces in Ukraine. They were reconsolidated and moved from Africa in May of 2022. Putin kept Wagner in the game because over time it became painfully clear that Spetsnaz and other specialized units had lost legitimacy. They no longer inspired awe and fear among Ukrainian ranks. Wagner became the replacement for Spetsnaz. Because Wagner is not a conventional military force, but an assemblage of experienced mercenaries from different theaters around the world mixed with prison conscripts that were sent to Ukraine, they were unpredictable. Their tactics, techniques, and procedures were not standardized. They were effective creating chaos in the battle space. When Russia gained new territory, Wagner became the equivalent of Putin’s Waffen SS in the area. They were perceived as his fanatic, ultra-political, and loyal military arm. But the Ukrainian MOD realized that the failure of Russia to take Severodonetsk meant that they had to pivot to Bahkmut and Kramatorsk. And they saw a key opportunity to bait Wagner into Bahkmut over a protracted period of time. Russia foolishly played that game for nine months. It proved to be the incubator for seeds of dissension between Wagner and the Russian command.

Putin has lost one of his most effective military assets and the future of Wagner is at stake. Their role in Ukraine as a organised military unit has concluded - at least for the moment. Wagner was originally dependent on Putin’s financing, but has become vastly independently wealthy through their financial negotiations with local regimes around the world. The spoils of war may have provided Wagner with the ability to self finance somewhat into the future. Even so, Wagner leadership is now at war with its true creator and patron and will not soon be welcomed back into Russia.

Disruption as a Game Changer

The power and potential of disruption is on display. Ukraine’s military successes have been astonishing, but the battlefield war is far from over. Fighting could be long and protracted. It could continue for years. But this week the world was exposed to the chaos within the Russian military. They saw a reality in which Putin’s own protege and henchman was willing to raise arms against his government.

It does not take a leap of faith to imagine circumstances in which the stress and fractures of this ill-advised war on Ukraine snowball causing the Russian military establishment and political leadership to implode, as did the Soviet Union in 1991.


DW Phillips is an attorney, filmmaker, producer, writer, and published author. He was involved in war correspondence during the 1980s in Central America and Angola. His great grandfather escaped capture by Russian soldiers to emigrate from Lviv, Ukraine to the United States with his sweetheart, and then proceeded to help sixteen Jewish Ukranians from his childhood community make the same journey to freedom. He is presently working on a documentary about the faith, courage, and unity of ordinary Ukrainians in times of invasion.


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